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The Quotable Stanley Mosk
By

JOSEPH

A.

WAPNER*

During most of Stanley Mosk's twenty years on the California
Supreme Court, I was a California trial judge. Like all diligent trial
judges, I reviewed the decisions of the California Supreme Court in order
to keep abreast of the law. Accordingly, I had frequent exposure to Justice Mosk's erudite majority opinions. But I also took the time to read
many of his dissenting and concurring opinions.
I have chosen a sampling of excerpts from Justice Mosk's dissenting
and concurring opinions1 to demonstrate what otherwise might be overlooked: his wit, good humor, compassion, sense of fairness, and willingness to innovate. It is not my intention to discuss Justice Mosk's notable
contributions to various fields of law; rather, I wish to show the qualities
of the man as evidenced by his own words.
It has been said that dissenting opinions reveal more about a justice
than do his majority opinions. Justice Douglas once wrote that dissident
views often deal with problems on which society itself is divided. In writing dissents, he declared, judges "prove their worth by showing their independence and fortitude. Their dissents or concurring opinions may
salvage for tomorrow the principle that was sacrificed or forgotten
today." 2
In his dissents, Justice Mosk has often called for innovation. For
example, in Borer v. American Airlines,3 the majority refused to recognize
a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, pointing out that other
states had acted similarly.4 Justice Mosk asserted that California courts
*

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge (retired). A.B., 1941, University of Southern Cali-

fornia; L.L.B., 1948, University of Southern California Law Center.
1. As these passages show, Justice Mosk cannot be pigeonholed as a "liberal" or "conservative" judge. His opinions show an effort in each case to arrive at a decision based on
principle and common sense. For an elaboration of Mosk's analytical method, see Goldman,
The Anatomy of a Mosk Opinion, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443 (1985).
2. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguardof Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 104,
106-07 (1948). In his article, Douglas quoted Chief Justice Hughes: "A dissent in a court of
last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day,
when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes
the court to have been betrayed." Id. at 106.
3. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
4. Id. at 449 n.2, 563 P.2d at 864 n.2, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308 n.2.
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should not blindly follow the crowd, stating, "[w]hen [the] crowd is
marching in the wrong direction, we have not heretofore hesitated to
5
break ranks and strike out on our own."
In Hawkins v. Superior Court,6 Mosk took the unusual step of writing a concurrence to his own majority opinion.7 He wrote first for the
court, applying the well-known, two-tiered equal protection analysis.
Writing for himself, he added that there should be an intermediate test,
as advocated by Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court:
I am taking the liberty of explaining why, if ours were not a
collegial body and mine was the responsibility alone, I would apply
a new and refined test. My diagnosis of the theoretic and pragmatic fallacies in the traditional two-tier test of equal protection
suggests the need for adoption of a third, or intermediate,
test. . . . [I]n my view the ultimate acceptance of an intermediate
test is foreordained in Supreme Court opinions: the question is not
whether, but when, the third test will become standard. I regret
that our court has failed to forthrightly assume leadership among
the states on this important question of constitutional law.'
Justice Mosk also has been alert to point out where the majority has
withdrawn from earlier innovations in the law. In Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp.,' he deplored what he considered to be the majority's retreat
from fundamental products liability principles. He wrote:
This will be remembered as the dark day when this court, which
heroically took the lead in originating the doctrine of products liability and steadfastly resisted efforts to inject concepts of negligence into the newly designed tort, inexplicably turned 180 degrees
and beat a hasty retreat almost back to square one. The pure concept of products liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured by
this court for the past decade and a half is reduced to a shambles. 1
Although he advocates strict liability in the consumer products context, Justice Mosk has called for a more limited concept of liability in
other areas of the law. He wrote a separate concurring opinion to express his views in Lugosi v. UniversalPictures," where the court declined
5. Id. at 458, 563 P.2d at 869, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
6. 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
7. Mosk noted that it was "not unprecedented for a justice to write a separate concurrence to an opinion of which he was the author for the court." Id. at 595, 586 P.2d at 923, 150
Cal. Rptr. at 442 (Mosk, J., concurring) (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196
(1959) (Brennan, J., concurring), and Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
8. 22 Cal. 3d at 595, 586 P.2d at 923, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 442 (Mosk, J., concurring).
9. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
10. Id. at 755, 575 P.2d at 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (Mosk, J.,dissenting) (citations
omitted).
11. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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to recognize a property right in Bela Lugosi's motion picture personification of Count Dracula.
In Lugosi, the actor's heirs had sought compensation from a motion
picture studio that produced dolls and other likenesses of Count Dracula.
Characterizing the facts, Mosk stated: "[As in] the horror films that
brought him fame, Bela Lugosi rises from the grave 20 years after death
to haunt his former employer. . . . [H]is vehicle is a strained adaptation
of a common law cause of action heretofore unknown either in a statute
or case law in California." 12 Addressing the merits, Mosk inquired rhetorically whether "the descendants of George Washington [could] sue
the Secretary of the Treasury for placing his likeness on the dollar bill." 13
He noted that
Bela Lugosi did not. . . create Dracula, [but] merely acted out a
popular role that had been garnished with the patina of age, as had
innumerable other thespians over the decades. His performance
gave him no more claim on Dracula than that of countless actors
on Hamlet who have portrayed the Dane in a unique manner.14
Dissenting in another property rights case, In re Wilson, 15 Mosk asserted that real property boundaries have little to do with Indian hunting
and fishing rights.16 The Wilson majority had denied habeas corpus relief
to an Indian convicted of hunting on former Indian territory during the
off season. 7 The theory behind the majority opinion was that the Indians' hunting rights had been extinguished along with their title when the
government "purchased" the land years before.1 Contrary to the majority's holding, Mosk would have held that such rights can exist apart from
the right of occupancy.1 9 Recognizing the plight of some modern-day
Indian tribes, he observed that "[v]enison on the hoof and peripatetic
trout are unlikely to feel circumscribed by metes and bounds."2 °
Justice Mosk often has used his dissenting opinions to express his
distaste for the majority's treatment of the weak and disadvantaged. For
example, in Perez v. City of San Bruno,2 1 the majority approved a municipality's decision to cut off the water supply of a resident who refused to
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431-32, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30 (Mosk, J.,concurring).
Id. at 827, 603 P.2d at 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
Id. at 826, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
30 Cal. 3d 21, 634 P.2d 363, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
Id. at 37, 634 P.2d at 373, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 36, 634 P.2d at 373, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
Id. at 36, 634 P.2d at 372, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
Id. at 38, 634 P.2d at 374, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
Id. at 37, 634 P.2d at 373, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
27 Cal. 3d 875, 616 P.2d 1287, 168 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1980).
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pay the city's garbage collection fees.2 2 The woman had refused to pay
because she had no refuse for the city to collect. Justice Mosk's dissent
concluded as follows:
Mrs. Perez, who has acted in propria persona throughout these
proceedings, has undoubtedly annoyed city officials by insisting
that one should not pay for municipal services unneeded and unused. Of such quiet heroics are martyrs born. Two and a half decades ago Mrs. Rosa Parks annoyed the officials of Montgomery,
Alabama, simply by insisting that she should not be required to sit
in the back of the bus. Just as Mrs. Parks resisted bureaucracy for
a principle-and ultimately brought about the end of compulsory
segregation in the south-so Mrs. Perez in apparent splendid solitude is resisting a municipal bureaucracy for a principle. Although
the majority fail to see it, I believe due process and justice are her
companions. 23
In another instance, the majority refused compensation to a former
prison inmate who had been injured serving as a fireman during his
prison term. Justice Mosk dissented. He wrote:
This petitioner is no longer confined to prison but remains a paraplegic as a result of [his] injuries. . . . I cannot agree that. . . he
is now and for the remainder of his life will be entitled to only a
fraction of the benefits afforded to a firefighter who suffered the
same disability but who was not a prisoner at the time of injury.
. . . [T]here is no rational basis for treating him differently from
others who have suffered the same disability while engaged in the
same activity. To do so is to impose punitive treatment upon this
petitioner
not merely for the penal term provided by law but for
24
life.
Justice Mosk has dissented vigorously when he has perceived the
majority as affording inadequate protection to civil rights and liberties, or
as giving undue weight to competing concerns. In Hildebrandv. Unemployment InsuranceAppeals Board,2 5 for example, a majority of the court
upheld the Board's denial of benefits to a woman who refused to work on
a day of religious significance. 26 In his dissent, Mosk stressed the overriding importance of religious freedom:
22. Id. at 895, 616 P.2d at 1298, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
23. Id. at 898-99, 616 P.2d at 1300, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In a
footnote, Mosk added that "history has demonstrated over and again that principled zealots
frequently achieve an ultimate transition from obloquy to apotheosis." Id. at 898 n.l, 616 P.2d
at 1300 n.1, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.1.
24. Meredith v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 777, 783, 567 P.2d 746,
749, 140 Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
25. 19 Cal. 3d 765, 566 P.2d 1297, 140 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1977).
26. Id. at 768, 566 P.2d at 1298, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 152. The group was the Worldwide
Church of God.
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The United States has been unique among nations of the world in
its vindication of the right of individuality in religion. The practices of religion, under our Constitution, are attributes of individual men and women, acting alone or in concert, not -f the state or

by the leave of the state. To preserve that principle not only
should we tolerate no alliance between church and state, we must
also be vigilant to prevent overt hostility between church and state.
The only acceptable role of the state is to be totally benign in its
attitude toward religion ....

27

In another case involving First Amendment issues, Mosk observed
that, "[a]s the melancholy lessons of history teach us, the road to censorship is paved with good intentions." 2 8 Yet Mosk is willing to draw lines,
so that only what he perceives to be actual First Amendment freedoms
are protected. Thus, in his Weaver v. Jordan2 9 dissent, he asserted that
while the First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression, "it does
not guarantee the right to be paid for the exercise of that freedom." 30
What are perhaps Justice Mosk's most controversial views were expressed in the racial quota cases.3 1 He concluded his dissent in one of
them-DeRonde v. Regents of the University of California3 2 -as follows:
Years ago medical doctors attempted to cure morphine addiction
with doses of heroin. Such efforts were doomed to failure, and
worse. Today the university is attempting to cure the remnants of
discrimination against minorities with programmed discrimination
against the majority. The failure of this misguided social homeopathy is equally predictable. Discrimination-for or against any
group-is addictive; the belief that it can be temporary, limited, or
controlled is naive and self-deluding.3 3
Mosk invoked the aid of George Orwell in another quota case, calling the majority's refusal to defend a quota by its name an exercise in
"doublethink" and "newspeak." 34 He concluded: "George Orwell is
nodding complacently in his grave, as he wins vindication even before
27. Id. at 775-76, 566 P.2d at 1303, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 157 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
28. People v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 430, 443, 531 P.2d 761, 769, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193,
201 (1975) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966).
30. Id. at 250, 411 P.2d at 300, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis

omitted).
31. DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr.
677, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d
1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, cert. dismissed,449 U.S. 811 (1980); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), modified, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
32. 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1981).
33. Id. at 906-07, 625 P.2d at 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 286-87, 604 P.2d 1365, 1383, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 475, 493-94 (1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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1984 for his dire apprehensions about the misdirection of society."3
In the area of criminal procedure, Mosk's opinions reflect his desire
to fashion procedures that are both sensible and fair, as well as constitutionally sound. In re Deborah C3 involved the question of whether a
private security guard should be required to provide Miranda warnings
when carrying out an arrest. Justice Mosk declared in his separate
opinion:
I would invoke the folk wisdom that if an object looks like a duck,
walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is likely to be a duck.
If a security officer in an establishment open to the public dresses
like a peace officer, carries a gun and a. . . badge. . . and conducts himself in the authoritative manner of a peace officer, he
surely will be deemed in the eyes of the public and detained suspects to be the equivalent of a peace officer. He should
37 be held to
the obligations imposed by law upon a peace officer.
In People v. Superior Court (Meyers),38 the majority approved a procedure by which the police, armed with a warrant, brought the victim of
a crime into the defendant's home to identify stolen property. Justice
Mosk protested in dissent:
The police practice here in issue. . . is not only unlawful, it is also
dangerous. . . . We ignore at our peril, I submit, the sad lessons
that history teaches as to the high price of vigilante justice: when
private citizens are encouraged to act as "police agents," official
lawlessness thrives and the liberties of all are put in jeopardy.
Surely we should not39 now repeat the mistakes of a discredited era
of our frontier past.
Mosk has called for a similar common sense approach in connection
with other criminal law issues. In Taylor v. Superior Court,' the court
had to decide whether the utterance of explicit threats by the defendant
during an armed robbery should make the crime a more serious one for
sentencing purposes. The majority's answer was yes, 4 but Justice Mosk
thought otherwise. He wrote:
In every robbery in which the criminal aims a gun at his victim as
he demands his money or property, [there] is an implied but unmistakable. . . threat that [the gun] will be used if the demands
35. Id. at 287, 604 P.2d at 1383, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
36. 30 Cal. 3d 125, 635 P.2d 446, 177 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1981).
37. Id. at 141, 635 P.2d at 455, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (Mosk, J., concurring).
38. 25 Cal. 3d 67, 598 P.2d 877, 157 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1979).
39. Id. at 87, 598 P.2d at 889-90, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
40. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970), overruled on other grounds,
People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 92 n.12, 539 P.2d 43, 51 n.12, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483, n.12
(1975).
41. 3 Cal. 3d at 584-85, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
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are not promptly met. Under the circumstances, such a deliberate
gesture can have no other meaning. Nothing is added, therefore,
when the robber makes the threat explicit by concluding his demands with the qualifying phrase, "or I'll shoot"--or any variation
on that theme, [such as] "or I'll kill you," "or I'll blow your head
off," "or we'll have an execution right here." The latter two formulations were used in the case at bar; dispassionately viewed,
however, they are merely vigorous semantic descendants of the
classic highwayman's command, "Your money or your life!"'4 2
In other contexts, Mosk has never hesitated to point out the unfairness of majority decisions that uphold a litigant's position, but deny the
relief sought. In Westbrook v. Mihaly,43 for example, a group of San
Francisco voters challenged a state constitutional provision that required
local general obligation bond proposals to be approved by a two-thirds
vote rather than by a simple majority vote. The voters sought implementation of certain bond proposals that had received a majority vote, but
not a two-thirds vote. While the court agreed that the two-thirds vote
requirement denied the voters equal protection of the laws, it declined to
order the city to proceed with the defeated bond offers. Mosk's separate
opinion included the following discourse:
The majority tell the parties who initiated these proceedings, who
used their talents and resources to seek and obtain a hearing in this
court, and who invoked the constitutional principles on which we
here rely, that they are undeniably right, their concept of the law is
totally vindicated-but they lose, their petition for a preemptory
writ denied. This is indeed a Pyrrhic victory ....
[These] aggrieved parties who knocked on our door are
turned away with approbation but without assistance. 4
Mosk also objected to unfairness in White v. County of San Diego.45
In White, a public entity had acquired through condemnation the land
needed for a road-widening project. It had recouped the compensation
paid, however, by levying corresponding assessments on the landowners'
adjacent parcels. Justice Mosk could not subscribe to the majority's approval of the county's actions. He explained:
The county's scheme is a cynical method of.

.

.shifting the

cost of an improvement benefitting the public onto the backs of a
few landowners because of the fortuity of their location. Not only
do the landowners lose a portion of their property, but they are
42. Id. at 592-93, 477 P.2d at 141, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43. 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970).
44. Id. at 802-04, 471 P.2d at 513-15, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 865-67 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
45. 26 Cal. 3d 897, 608 P.2d 728, 163 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1980).
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then deprived of the constitutionally required compensation ...
I strongly disapprove of this acquisitive device by which a public
entity, in order to obtain private property, puts funds therefor in a
landowner's pocket-and then proceeds to pick the pocket. 6
That Justice Mosk has the flexibility to change his views is demonstrated by Smith v. Anderson,4' where Mosk found himself in agreement
with a majority of his colleagues, but in disagreement with an opinion he
had rendered previously as Attorney General of California. He discovered that Justice Jackson, a former Attorney General of the United
States, had faced the same predicament in an earlier case. He adopted a
portion of the Jackson opinion as his own:
'I am entitled to say of [my former] opinion what any discriminating reader must think of it-that it was as foggy as the statute the
Attorney General was asked to interpret. . . . Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by which a judge may recede from a
prior opinion that has proven untenable and perhaps misled
others. . . . Baron Bramwell extricated himself from a somewhat
similar embarrassment by saying, "The matter does not appear to
me now as it appears to have appeared to me then." )48
The same problem arose ten years later, in King v. Central Bank,4 9
and the quotations were employed again.5 0
Others will no doubt point out the great contribution Justice Mosk
has made to our jurisprudence-and with that praise I heartily agree.
Those of us who have been trial judges have looked for and found guidance and wisdom in Justice Mosk's opinions. Through his pen, he has
demonstrated the personal qualities of fair play, prescience, openness,
and understanding-as well as a superior intellect. These qualities make
him one of California's outstanding public servants.

46. Id. at 911, 608 P.2d at 736, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 648 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
47. 67 Cal. 2d 635, 433 P.2d 183, 63 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1967).
48. Id. at 646, 433 P.2d at 190, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (Mosk, J., concurring) (quoting
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
49. 18 Cal. 3d 840, 558 P.2d 857, 135 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1977).
50. Id. at 850, 558 P.2d at 862, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (Mosk, J., concurring).

